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Abstract 
This paper presents amethod for axiomatizing a variety of models for decision making under uncertainty, 
including Expected Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. This method identifies, for each model, the 
situations that permit consistent inferences about the ordering of value differences. Examples of rank- 
dependent and sign-dependent preference patterns are used to motivate the models and the "tradeoff consis- 
tency" axioms that characterize them. The major properties of the value function in Cumulative Prospect 
Theory--diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion--are contrasted with the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility that is commonly assumed inExpected Utility. 
Attempts to explain decisions under uncertainty that violate Expected Utility have gen- 
erated several new ideas. (For a survey, see Fishburn 1988.) One notion is that the 
objects of choice are prospects, defined in terms of gains and losses relative to neutral 
reference point, rather than acts defined in terms of final asset positions. This notion, 
first proposed by Markowitz (1952), is the cornerstone of Kahneman and Tversky's 
(1979) prospect heory. The significance of the reference point stems from the observa- 
tions that people are generally risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses, and that losses 
loom larger than gains. Another empirical generalization that is incorporated into pros- 
pect theory is the tendency to overweight small probabilities and to underweight high 
probabilities. It is natural to model this phenomenon by introducing decision weights 
obtained from a nonadditive transformation of the probability scale. The problem then 
arises how to calculate expectation with respect o a nonadditive measure. Several au- 
thors (Weymark, 1981; Quiggin, 1982; Schmeidler, 1989; Yaari, 1987) proposed a solu- 
tion, which reduces to the Choquet functional (Choquet, 1953-4). This model trans- 
forms cumulative rather than individual probabilities; we call it the cumulative model. 1 
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It has been recognized by several authors (Starmer and Sugden, 1989; Luce and 
Fishburn, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) that the basic elements of prospect the- 
ory are compatible with the cumulative functional, and that it is possible to construct a 
model that combines these approaches to produce what we call Cumulative Prospect 
Theory. This paper presents an axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory, which 
extends and generalizes the formal development in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The 
present treatment differs from Luce and Fishburn (1991) in that it does not involve an 
operation of joint receipt, does not require higher-order gambles, and does not restrict 
the shape of the value function. 
The axiomatization presented in this paper is based on the tradeoff consistency ap- 
proach developed by Wakker (1989) and Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988). It provides 
a unified procedure for axiomatizing Expected Utility and generalized expectation mod- 
els, and is illustrated in Section 1. The key idea is that different models are characterized 
by the particular situations in which the ordering of value differences can be inferred 
from preferences. For example, an inference about he ordering of value differences that 
is valid in Expected Utility is not valid in the cumulative model unless the prospects in 
question are comonotonic, i.e., induce the same (desirability) ordering of states of na- 
ture. Likewise, an inference about value differences in Cumulative Prospect Theory 
requires, in addition, that the critical outcomes will have the same sign, i.e., are all gains 
or all losses. We show that a natural characterization f Cumulative Prospect Theory is 
obtained by accepting only these inferences. An aim of this paper has been to bring to the 
fore the tradeoff consistency approach to axiomatic preference theory. The natural way 
in which characterizations of earlier theories are extended to Cumulative Prospect The- 
ory, as well as the simplicity of additional specifying conditions (for diminishing marginal 
utility and loss aversion), provide vidence for the fruitfulness of this approach. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I gives examples of preferences that violate 
Expected Utility and exhibit rank-dependence and sign-dependency. Section 2 presents 
notations and definitions. The next four sections characterize Expected Utility, Cumula- 
tive Utility, Sign-Dependent Expected Utility, and Cumulative Prospect Theory. To 
demonstrate he unity and generality of the tradeoff-consistency approach, we axioma- 
tize all four models. The first two have already been presented in Wakker (1989); they 
are used in the characterization f the other two. 
A schematic summary of the results appears in Table 7.1. The table shows that CPT 
concerns two independent generalizations of expected utility, one by rank-dependence, 
the other by sign-dependence. Rank-dependence p rmits, for instance, pessimism so 
that events associated with less favorable outcomes are weighted more heavily. Sign- 
dependence p rmits different decision weights for events associated with gains than for 
events associated with losses. The elicitation of value difference orderings is not dis- 
turbed by rank-dependence whenever the prospects used in the elicitation are comono- 
tonic. The elicitation of value difference orderings is not disturbed by sign-dependence 
whenever the prospects used in the elicitation are "cosigned", i.e. the critical outcomes 
all have the same sign; this will be further explained below. 
Extensions and generalizations of the results are discussed inSection 8. For instance, 
it is demonstrated that double matching could have been omitted in Theorem 2.c of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and the extension to infinite state spaces is given. Section 
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9 investigates the characteristics of the value function, and provides a method for com- 
paring the value functions of different decision makers in Cumulative Prospect Theory, 
analogous to the Arrow-Pratt results for Expected Utility. 2 Loss aversion is character- 
ized ("losses loom larger than gains"). Proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
1. Examples 
We begin with two examples that serve to illustrate the intuitions behind the models 
under consideration and to suggest the axioms that are used to characterize these mod- 
els. It seems useful to discuss some ideas and examples already at this stage, prior to 
giving a formal development. Suppose abiased coin will be tossed, yielding either heads 
(state 1) or tails (state 2). A decision maker chooses between prospects, i.e., payments 
contingent on the result of the toss. Throughout the paper outcomes are interpreted as 
changes of wealth rather than states of wealth. That is, outcomes correspond to gains and 
losses defined relative to the status quo or an appropriate reference point. Therefore we 
use the term prospect instead of act, and value function instead of utility function) Let 
(Xl, X2) be the prospect yielding ~C 1 if state 1 obtains, ~2 if state 2 obtains. 
Example 1.1: Rank-dependence. Consider the following pattern of preferences: 
(11, 20) > (10, 21) (1.1) 
(31,20) < (30,21). (1.2) 
A possible interpretation of the shift of preference from (1.1) to (1.2) is as follows. 
Receiving $11 instead of $10, denoted by [11; 10], contingent on state 1, outweighs [21; 
20], contingent on state 2. However, [31; 30] contingent on state i does not outweigh [21; 
20], contingent on state 2. Apparently [11; 101 has more impact han [31; 30]. We sum- 
marize the inference made from (1.1) and (1.2) by writing [11; 10] > * [31; 30]. Applying 
Expected Utility (EU) gives 
rrlv(ll) + rr2v(20) - 7rlv(lO) + "rr2v(21) 
and 
rrlV(31) + 'rr2v(20) < arlV(30) + 'rr2v(21), 
where re1 and 7r2 are the decision maker's probabilities for states 1 and 2. It follows 
readily that v(l l)  - v(10) > v(31) - v(30). Under EU therefore, > * reveals orderings 
of value differences. Suppose that we also observe the preferences 
(40, 31) > (41, 30) (1.3) 
(40, 11) ~ (41, 10). (1.4) 
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These preferences reveal the opposite orderings of value differences, i.e., v(31) - v(30) 
- v(l l) - v(10). Thus a contradiction has resulted under EU, and the above four 
preferences violate EU. We shall see below that there is a sense in which all violations of 
EU are reducible to this form. 4 
This paper investigates generalizations of EU in which the inequality v(11) - v(10) > 
v(31) - v(30) cannot be inferred from the preferences (1.1) and (1.2). All the models 
that we investigate are special cases of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). The first is 
Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa's (1987) Cumulative Utility (CU), which allows a decision 
maker to pay more attention to a state depending, for example, on whether or not it 
yields the least desirable outcome in a given prospect. Such behavior might be associated 
with pessimism. Note that in (1.1) state 2 yields the most desirable outcomes, whereas in 
(1.2) it yields the least desirable outcomes. A decision maker who pays more attention to 
the less desirable state, will assign more weight o state 2 in (1.2) than in (1.1). This may 
explain the shift in preference. In this case it is not possible to infer v(l l) - v(10) > 
v(31) - v(30) because the weights attached to the two states are not the same in (1.1) as 
in (1.2). Thus the two pairs of preferences no longer yield contradictory inequalities. The 
inference v(31) - v(30) > v(l l) - v(10) remains valid because state 2 yields the least 
desirable outcome in both (1.3) and (1.4). 
Under Cumulative Utility (CU), inferences about orderings of value differences 
are valid only if the desirability ordering of the states is the same for all prospects 
under consideration, i.e., if these prospects are comonotonic. In this case it is ensured 
that for each state the weight assigned by the decision maker is the same for all 
prospects. [] 
We turn now to another pattern of preference, involving both gains and losses. 
Example 1.2: Sign-dependence. Consider the following preferences: 
( -2 ,  -9 )  > ( -4 ,  -6 )  (1.5) 
(4, -9 )  ~ (2, -6 )  (1.6) 
(10,4) > (12,2) (1.7) 
(10, -2)  < (12, -4)  (1.8) 
The first two preferences yield [ - 2; - 4] > * [4; 2]; the second pair yields [4; 2] > * [ - 2; 
-4]. Under EU, the former implies the inequality v( -2)  - v ( -  4) ___ v(4) - v(2), 
whereas the latter implies the reversed inequality; consequently, EU is violated. The 
above preferences, however, can be accommodated by CPT, which suggests risk aversion 
for gains and risk seeking for losses. Under CPT it will not be possible to infer either 
inequality from the given preferences because the weights attached to state I are not the 
same in (1.5) where the outcomes are negative as in (1.6) where the outcomes are 
positive; the same argument applies to state 2 in the preferences (1.7) and (1.8). It is 
noteworthy that CU cannot account for these preferences. In this case CU, like EU, 
yields contradictory orderings of value differences because the outcomes in state 1 are 
always more desirable than in state 2. Under CPT we permit inferences about orderings 
of value differences only if all prospects are not only comonotonic but also have the same 
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sign profile, i.e., for each state the outcomes are either all nonnegative, orall nonpositive. 
Only when both conditions are met is it ensured that for each state the weight assigned 
by the decision maker is the same for all prospects. [] 
The informal discussion of the above examples has suggested the axioms that are 
needed to characterize the respective models. These axioms will be formulated in the 
following sections. Because this article brings together four different models, a some- 
what heavy notation must be adopted, using indexes for the decision weights and the 
*-binary relations introduced below to distinguish among the models. In contexts where 
not all these models are involved, it is possible to simplify the notation by eliminating 
some of the indices, as in Section 9 below. 
2. Basic concepts 
Let S = {1,..., n} be a finite state space. Subsets of S are called events. X is a set of 
outcomes. We assume that Xis a connected topological space (e.g., X = IR; for topolog- 
ical definitions, see for instance Kelley, 1955). ~denotes the set of prospects, i.e., func- 
tions from S toX. We often identify ~withX n, so that (xl,..., xn) denotes the prospect 
assigning outcome xj to state j for e achj. Given a prospect f, an outcome x, and a state j, 
we usexjfto denote the prospectfwithf(j) replaced byx. ~is endowed with the product 
topology. In this paper outcomes describe changes with respect o a status quo or an 
appropriate r ference l vel. To underscore this interpretation we use the term prospect 
instead of Savage's term act. For an outcome x ~X, Ydenotes the constant prospext (x, 
... ,x). The status quo is an element of X, denoted by 0. We assume in this paper that the 
status quo is fixed, i.e., we restrict attention to preferences in relation to one status quo. 
The question concerning variations in the status quo lies beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
Let ~ denote apreference r lation on ~ As usual > denotes the asymmetric part, - 
the symmetric part, and 4 ,  < denote reversed preferences. We shall use the same 
notations for the binary relations onXderived through constant prospects. That is, x ~y 
if and only if s ~ y2 An outcomex > 0 is positive, an outcomex < 0 is negative. LetX + = 
{x EX:x ~0}andX-  = {x EX:x  <~ 0}. 
Below we provide standard efinitions of additive conjoint measurement. In the gen- 
eralizations of EU studied in this article, additMty is typically satisfied only on specific 
subsets of ~ The shapes of these subsets are characteristic of particular generalizations 
of EU. Standard conditions, such as independence, will be satisfied only on these sub- 
sets; also the definition of essential states hould be restricted to those subsets. Hence we 
shall generalize the standard efinitions of additivity to subsets F of .~. A function V 
represents ~ onF if, for al lf  g ~ F, f  ~g if and only if V(f) _> V(g). If ~ is represented by
a function on F, then ~ is a weak order on F, i.e., it is complete on F (f ~ g or g ~ f for  all 
f, g @ F) and transitive on F (f ~ g and g ~ h then f ~ h for all f, g, h @ F). If V is 
continuous on F then ~ is also continuous, i.e., {f E F:f ~ g} and (f ~ F:f ~ g} are closed 
subsets o fF  for eachg E F. Vis (continuously) ordinal if it is unique up to a continuous 
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strictly increasing transformation. It is an interval scale if it is unique up to a positive 
affine transformation, i.e., up to multiplication by a positive constant, and addition of a 
real number. It is a ratio-scale if it is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant. 
Vis an additive representation on F if there exist real-valued functions V1, ..., Vn such 
that V(f) = ~7"= fl/)(f(/')) for al l f  ~ F; obviously the domains of the l~'s must contain all 
values f(]) fo r f  E F. If an additive Vrepresents ~> on F, then the Vy's are called additive 
value functions on F. 
An eventA is inessential on F, or F inessential for short, i f f  - g for all f, g in F that agree 
outside A; an event is essential on F if it is not inessential on F. We call ~ weakly 
monotonic on F if, for all f, g C F, f ~ g whenever f(j) >~ g(j) for all j; ~> is strongly 
monotonic on F if, for all f, g E F,f  > g whenever f(/') ~> g(j) for allj andf(i) > g(i) for 
some F essential i. In this article, the expression "on ~ '  is usually omitted. 
A capacity Won S is a function on 2 s such that W(9)) = O, W(S) = 1, andA D B 
W(A) >>_ W(B). Obviously, if a capacity Wisadditive, i.e., W(A U B) = W(A) + W(B) for 
all disjoint events A, B, then W is a probability measure. For a capacity W on S, and a 
function h:S~IR, the Choquet integral, denoted by fshdW, or fsh(i)dW, is 
fire W({i:h(i) >_ t})dt + fro- [W({i:h(i) >- t}) - 1]dt. 
We next describe the subsets o f f  on which the various models are additive. For EU this 
is all of ~ Next we turn to CU. Let o be a permutation on {1 . . . .  , n}, and let ~:  = {f E 
~.f(o(1))  ~< ... ~< f(o(n))}; these are the additive subsets in CU. For Sign-Dependent 
Expected Utility, introduced below, let ,~+ be the set of nonnegative prospects, and let 
f -  be the set of nonpositive prospects. For a prospectfdef inef  + and f -  in the usualway, 
i.e.,f~(s) = f(s) iff(s) ~> 0, f  + (s) = 0 iff(s) < 0 , f -  (s) = f(s) iff(s) ~< 0 , f -  (s) = 0 ill(s) 
> 0. We say that a prospectflives on eventA if f(]) - 0 for al l j  ~ Ac; 5 its positive 
(negative) part lives onA i f f  + ( f - )  lives onA, i.e., if f(/') ~< 0 (f(]) ~> 0) for allj E A c. Let 
be the set of prospects for which the positive part lives onA, the negative part onAC; 
these are the additive subsets in the Sign-Dependent Expected Utility model. We com- 
bine superscripts to denote intersections. For example ~o+ = ~ (3 yv (-/ if+ = 
~. . f (o (1 ) )  ~< ... ~< f(o(n)),f = f+,f+ lives onA}. The sets ~o are the additive 
subsets for CPT. 
Each of the representations developed in this paper can be expressed as a weighted 
sum of the form Y~Trjv(f(I')), where the ~rj's are called decision weights. The "rrj's are often 
endowed with superscripts. 
The following structural conditions are assumed throughout the paper. 
Structural Assumption 2.1: S = {1, .. . ,  n} is a finite state space, o~= X n is the set of 
prospects endowed with a connected product opology, and ~ is a binary relation on ~. 
3. Expected utility 
Under Expected Utility (EU) there exists a probability measure P on S, and a value 
function v.'X--> IR, such that 
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W'.f ~-) J~s v(f(s) )dP 
represents preferences. This can be rewritten as the weighted sum 
with 
~j = P(]) 
for each j. The model is additive; hence the usual definitions of additive conjoint mea- 
surement can be adopted. Note that qvj > 0 if and only i fx f  > yjffor some outcomesx, y 
and a prospect f, i.e., if and only ifj is essential. Here essentiality is taken on all of F, as in 
the standard treatment of additive conjoint measurement. 
The following * relations are useful for both elicitation and characterization. Define 
[x;y] > * [x';y'], orxy > *x'y' for short, if there exist prospectsf, g and a state j, such that 
xjf > yjg and (3.1) 
x'jf < y'jg (3.2) 
We write > * instead of > * if in the lower preference we have ~< instread of < andj is 
essential. The * relations in general do not have to satisfy natural properties, e.g. > * 
does not have to be asymmetric, and > * does not have to be the asymmetric part of > *. 
As usual, < *, < * denote the reversed relations. The following lemma shows that under 
EU these relations are indeed suited to elicit the function v. While elementary, the result 
is central for this paper; hence we display it as a lemma and give its proof. 
I.emma 3.1. If EU holds then: 
xy > * x'y'  ~ v(x) - v(y) > v(x') - v(y') ,  (3.3) 
xy > *x 'y '  ~ v(x) - v(y) >_ v(x') - v(y').  (3.4) 
Proof. Consider (3.3). We substitute EU in (3.1) and (3.2), to get 
2"rriv(f(i)) + "rrjv(x) > 2"rriv(g(i)) + vjv(y) 
i~j i;ej 
2"rriv(f(i)) + vjv(x') < 2~riv(g(i)) + "rrjv(y'). 
i;ej i; ~j 
This implies ~rjv(x) - ~jv(y) > qvjv(x') - "rrjv(y'). Thus, by cancelling the evidently 
positive -rrj, we get v(x) - v(y) > v(x') - v(y'). The same reasoning applies to (3.4), 
except hat positivity of "rrj (i.e., essentiality of state j) does not follow from the prefer- 
ences, so it has to be assumed. [] 
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The following condition is necessary for EU: 
Definition 3.2. Tradeoffconsistency is satisfied if there are no outcomes x,y, x',y' such 
that bothxy > *x'y' andxy ~ *x'y' hold. 
Wakker (1989, Theorem IV.2.7 and Remark A3.1) showed that this condition is also 
sufficient for EU in the presence of the usual assumptions. 
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that the Structural Assumption 2.1 holds, and that at least wo 
states are essential. Then EU with continuous value function holds if and only if > 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(a) weak ordering; 
(b) continuity; and 
(c) tradeoff consistency. 
Further, the probability measure isuniquely determined, and the value function is an 
interval scale. [] 
4. Cumulative utility (CU) 
Cumulative utility was initiated by Schmeidler (1989); see also Gilboa (1987). The term 
"cumulative utility" was introduced inTversky and Kahneman (1992). Another common 
term is "Choquet expected utility." Wakker (1990a) showed that cumulative utility can 
be applied to decision making under risk (where choice alternatives are probability 
distributions over outcomes, instead of acts or prospects), and then, under the natural 
assumption ofstochastic dominance, is identical to rank-dependent utility as introduced 
by Quiggin (1982). 
A central concept in cumulative utility is comonotonicity. A set of prospects F is 
comonotonic f for no f, g E F, i,j ~ S,f(i) > f(j) andg(i) < g(j). It follows readily (see, 
e.g., Wakker, 1989, Lemma VI.3.3) that F is comonotonic if and only ifF C ~o for some 
permutation o on {1, ..., n}. Hence the sets ~o are maximalcomonotonic sets. As we shall 
see, CU gives additive representations within maximal comonotonic sets; hence some of 
the conditions will be restricted to these sets. We say that CU holds if there exists a 
capacity W and a value function v : X--+ IR, such that 
Vf  ~ ~s v(f(i))dW 
represents preferences. This can be rewritten as the weighted sum 
n 
Zwyv{f(/')), (4.1) 
j=l 
as follows. For prospectfwe take a permutation o such thatf(o(1)) ~< ... ~< f(o(n)) and 
define 
r 
'no(/-) = W({o(/'), ..., o(n)}) - W({o(/' + 1), ..., o(n)}) (4.2) 
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for eachj. Dependency on o is expressed by the superscript c (for comonotonicity). Iff(j) 
N f( i )  for some i ~ j, then the ordering of states i andj by o can be chosen arbitrarily, and 
the decision weights ~ depend on this arbitrary choice. In that case it should be specified 
for a'~ which o is chosen. Usually no misunderstandings will arise, and, as is easily seen, 
the particular choice of o is immaterial for the end result in (4.1). Hence we usually do 
not indicate the dependence of the decision weights wjc on the permutation o induced 
byf. 
Note that for comonotonic prospects the same o can be chosen. Furthermore, "fro0. )c  > 
0 if and only if o(j) is essential on the maximal  comonotonic set with respect o o. A state 
can be essential on one maximal comonotonic set, but inessential on another. 
CU generalizes EU by allowing the decision weights of states to depend on the desir- 
ability ordering of the states induced by a given prospect. Indeed, (4.2) expresses the 
dependence on the set of states that yield an equivalent or better outcome. Such events 
are called cumulative. CU allows for some forms of optimism or pessimism (see Example 
1.1). The pattern of preferences in this example is obtained by setting 147({1}) = W({2}) 
= 1/3, v(x) = x forx -< 20, v(x) = 2x - 20 for 20 --- x _< 30, v(x) = 3x - 50 for 30 _< x _< 
40, v(x) = 4x - 90 for 40 <__ x. 
To characterize the model, the * relations are modified as follows. We writexy > * x'y'  
if (3.1) and (3.2) hold, provided the four prospects in question {xjf, yjg, x'jf, y'jg} are 
comonotonic. Analogously we write xy ~cxy*  ' ' if (3.1) and (3.2) hold with weak instead 
of strict preference in (3.2), provided the four prospects inquestion are comonotonic and 
j is essential on a maximal comonotonic set containing these prospects. The following 
lemma shows that under CU these relations reveal the ordering of value differences: 
Lemma 4.1. If CU holds then: 
* ' ' v (x)  v (x ' )  v (y ' ) ,  xy >cXy - v(y) > - 
xy ~ c X ' ' ~ v(x) - v(y) >_ v(x') - v(y'). 
Proof  The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.1, only now the decision weights 
"rri and -a-j are replaced by "rr c and "rr~, respectively. Comonotonicity guarantees that the 
same set of decision weights rr~ ... "rr c can be used for all prospects in question. [] 
The following condition is necessary for CU: 
Definition 4.2. Comonotonic tradeoffconsistency is satisfied if there are no outcomes x,
t ! * i t * t r y ,x  ,y  such that bothxy >~ cx y andxy <cXy hold. 
Wakker (1989, Theorem VI.5.1 and Remark A3.1) showed that this condition is also 
sufficient for CU in the presence of the usual assumptions. 
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the Structural Assumption 2.1 holds, and that there exists 
an F ~ with at least two F ~ essential states. CU with a continuous value function holds 
if and only if ~> satisfies the following conditions: 
(a) weak ordering; 
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(b) continuity; 
(c) comonotonic tradeoff consistency. 
Further, the capacity is uniquely determined, and the value function is an interval 
scale. [] 
5. Sign-dependent expected utility (SDEU) 
In this section we present a generalization f EU that allows for sign-dependence, but 
coincides with EU on ~+ and on o ~-  . This generalization, called Sign-Dependent Ex- 
pected Utility (SDEU), is of limited interest on its own; it is presented as a preparation for 
Cumulative Prospect Theory. A set F of prospects i cosigned if there do not existf, g E F, 
and a state j, such thatf(j) > 0, 0 > g(j).6 It is easily seen that F is cosigned if and only if 
F C o%4 for some eventA. Thus sets ~ are maximal cosigned sets. SDEU holds if there 
exist two probability measures P+ (associated with gains) and P -  (associated with 
losses), and a value function v, such that 
v:f  fs VO +(i))dP + + gv( f - ( i ) )dP -  (5.1) 
represents preferences. This model satisfies weak monotonicity since an increase in 
payment of f  will increase itherf + or f -  or (if the increase is from negative to positive) 
both, and will decrease neither. For the following expression it is necessary toset v(0) = 
0, as is commonly done in sign-dependent models. We shall assume this throughout the 
paper for the sign-dependent models. Then (5.1) can be rewritten as 
j=l 
where ~ is P + (j), also denoted by'rr +, iff(j) is positive, ~ is P - (j), also denoted by Trj-, 
i l l(j) is negative. The choice of ~ (s immaterial iff(j) is 0; it can be either ~rj + or "rr.-. 
Note that Trj + > 0 if and only ifj is essential on a maximal cosigned set where posit(ve 
outcomes are assigned to state j; the same applies to wj- > 0 (with negative outcomes 
assigned to state j). Note that a state can be essential for positive outcomes, and inessen- 
tial for negative outcomes. 
> *X' i To characterize the model, the * relations are modified as follows. We write xy s Y 
if (3.1) and (3.2) hold, provided the four prospects in question {xjf, yjg, x'f, y'jg} are 
cosigned. Analogously we write xy ~> s* x'y' if (3.1) and (3.2) hold with weak instead of 
strict preference in (3.2), the four prospects in question are cosigned, andj is essential on 
a maximal cosigned set containing the four prospects. Note that either x, y, x', y' are all 
nonnegative, or nonpositive. The following lemma shows that under SDEU these * 
relations reveal the ordering of value differences: 
Lemma 5.1. If SDEU holds, then: 
xy v(x) - v(y) > v(x ' )  - @% 
* x 'y '  xy v(x) - v(v) -> - v v') 
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Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.1, only now the decision weights 7r i
and wj are replaced by ~ and ~j, respectively. Because the prospects in question are 
cosigned the same decision weights ~1 -.. "rrsn can be used for all prospects in question. [] 
Thus the following condition is necessary for SDEU: 
Definition 5.2. Cosigned tradeoffconsistency is satisfied if there are no outcomes x,y, x', 
y' such that bothxy ~ * x'y' andxy < ~ x'y' hold. 
Again, this condition turns out to be sufficient in the presence of the usual conditions. 
We introduce two additional conditions, which will be further discussed in Section 6. 
Gain-loss consistency is satisfied if for allf, g ~ ~, f  - 0,f+ - g+, and f -  - g -  implies 
g - 0. We call ~> truly mixed if there exists a prospectfwithf  + > 0 and 0 >f - .  The 
following proposition is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 6.3. (Cosigned tradeoff 
consistency will, by Theorem 3.3, imply additivity of the representation both on ~-+ and 
on o~-, provided these sets have two or more essential states.) 
Proposition 5.3. Suppose that the Structural Assumption 2.1 holds and assume the 
truly mixed case. Then SDEU with continuous value function holds if and only if ~> 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(a) weak ordering; 
(b) continuity; 
(c) gain-loss consistency and cosigned tradeoff consistency. 
Further, both probability measures are uniquely determined, and the value function is 
a ratio scale. [] 
6. Cumulative prospect heory (CPT) 
This model combines the two preceding eneralizations of EU. A set of prospects is 
sign-comonotonic if it is both cosigned and comonotonic. It is easily seen that a set is 
sign-comonotonic if and only if it is a subset of a set ~o.  Hence the sets ~o are the 
maximal sign-comonotonic sets. They are of the form {f ~ o~(o(1)) ~< ... ~< f(o(k)) <, 0 
<, f(o(k + 1)) ~ ... <f(o(n))}, for some permutation o, integer k, and event A = 
{o(k + 1), ..., o(n)}. In CPT we have an additive representation within each set ~o~o; 
hence such sets ~4o will play a central part in the proofs. 
The notation was chosen to simplify the formulation of the model presented and 
axiomatized in Theorem 6.3. Consequently we integrate for negative outcomes in a way 
dual to that for positive outcomes, and the formulas will be different than those for CU. 
Two capacities W + and W- are associated with gains and losses respectively. We also 
use the dual of W- ,  denoted by 1111-, and defined by IV- (A) = 1 - W-  (AC),A C S. As 
usual v denotes avalue function. Now preferences are represented by
V: f~ fs V(f+(i))dW + + fs V(f-(i))dIV -. (6.1) 
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Note that for negative outcomes we use the dual of W-.  Thus CU results if W + is the 
dual of W-.  The following rewriting of (6.1) shows an appealing feature of the use of the 
dual capacity for the negative outcomes: 
fiR+ W+ ({i : v(f(i)) >- t})dt - L -  [W-  ({i : v(f(i)) <- t})ldt. (6.2) 
Without loss of generality we assume v(0) = 0. Then we can rewrite (6.1) as 
n 
qTCSv  " ~" j (f(j)), (6.3) 
j= l  
where the decision weights rr~ sare defined as follows. For prospectfwe take a permuta- 
tionoon{1, . . . ,n}andaksuchthatf(o(1)) <.. . .  <.f(o(k)) <. 0 <. f (o(k  + 1)) ~< ... ~< 
f(o(n)).  Next we define 
forj < k: rroCS0) = trot(/)) = W-({o(1), ..., o(j)}) - W-({o(1), ..., o(j - 1)}), (6.4) 
fo r j>k :  cs = c + . . . ,  - "%0) fro0)) = W+ ({o(j) ,  . . . ,  o(n)})  - W + ({o( j  + 1), o(n)}).  (6.5) 
So the decision weights are as in CU, except hat for positive f ( j )  we use W +, the 
gain-capacity, and for negative f(j) we use W- ,  the dual of the loss-capacity. Note that 
cs  > 9 "%q)) 0 af and only if o(j) is essential on the related maximal sign-comonotonic set. 
Recall that a state can be essential on one maximal sign-comonotonic set, but inessential 
on another. The comments following (4.2) about potential ambiguity in the notation of 
the decision weights apply here as well. As noted earlier, we use the double index to 
distinguish CPT from the other models discussed in the previous ection. The double 
index can be dropped when this model alone is considered, as in Section 9. 
To characterize the model, the * relations are modified as follows. We writexy >'csXy* ' ' 
if (3.1) and (3.2) hold, provided the four prospects in question {xjf, yjg, x'jf, y'jg} are 
sign-comonotonic. Analogously we write xy >>- c*s x'y' if (3.1) and (3.2) hold with weak 
instead of strict preference in (3.2), the four prospects in question are sign-comonotonic, 
and j is essential on a maximal sign-comonotonic set containing these prospects. The 
following lemma shows that under CPT these relations reveal the ordering of value 
differences: 
Lemma 6.1. If CPT holds, then: 
xy >csXy ~v(x)  - v(y) > v(x') - v(y'), 
xy >~csXy ~ v(x) - v(y) > v(x') - v(y'). 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.1, only now the decision weights 'rri 
and ~r~ are replaced by wcs and "rr cs, respectively Sign-comonotonicity ensures that the 
J t J " 
same set of decision weights "rr~ s ... ~r cs can be used for all prospects in question. [] 
The following condition is necessary for CPT: 
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Definition 6.2. Sign-comonotonic tradeoff cons&tency is satisfied if there are no out- 
comesx, y ,x ,y  such that bothxy * ' '  ' ' >~csXy andxy <*sx'y' hold. 
We shall only consider the case where tradeoffs between positive and negative out- 
comes can occur. That is, we assume that >~ is truly mixed: there exists a prospectfwith 
bothf  + > 0 and 0 > f - .  In the central theorem of this paper we shall also use gain-loss 
consistency (defined in Section 5). In Section 8 we show that this condition can often be 
omitted. Gain-loss consistency is somewhat weaker than the double-matching condition 
used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), but it is the only implication used in their proof. 
The proof of the following result is given in the Appendix: 
Theorem 6.3. Suppose the Structural Assumption 2.1 holds, and assume the truly- 
mixed case. Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) Cumulative Prospect Theory holds with a continuous value function; 
(ii) The preference r lation ~> satisfies the following conditions: 
(a) weak ordering; 
(b) continuity; 
(c) gain-loss consistency and sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency. 
Further, both capacities are uniquely determined, and the value function is a ratio 
scale. [] 
7. Summary of results 
Table 7.1. Orderings oftradeoffs are revealed through preferencesxf ~>yjgand eitherx'jf< y'jgorx'Jf<~ y'jg. 
Columns and rows in the table indicate the restrictions imposed upon the four prospects in question. The 
theory characterized by tradeoff consistency with respect to the revealed orderings oftradeoffs is given in the 
appropriate c ils. The relevant phenomena that deviate from EU are given in parentheses. 
cosigned 
(sign-dependence) m 
comonotonic 
(rank-dependence) CPT CU 
-- SDEU EU 
8. Extensions and generalizations 
Theorem 6.3 is the central representation theorem of this paper. Every preference r la- 
tion satisfying the conditions of further theorems below also satisfies the conditions of 
Theorem 6.3. However, as demonstrated below, some of the assumptions of Theorem 
6.3 can be weakened in special cases because they are implied by the other assumptions. 
Let us also mention that the outcome-dependent capacity form, characterized in Chew 
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and Wakker (1991), is more general than CPT. For decision making under risk, this 
model was presented in Green and Jullien (1988), Chew and Epstein (1989), Chateau- 
neuf (1990), Segal (1993), and was also discussed in Wakker (1993c). 
8.1. Omitting ain-loss consistency in theorem 6.3 
Gain-loss consistency is often implied by the other conditions, it can sometimes be 
omitted. In the proof of the following observation, given in Appendix A3, somewhat 
more general results are given. Here we only give the most accessible result. 
Observation 8.1. Let n _> 3. Suppose the following monotonicity condition is satisfied: 
[Vi :f(i) > g(i), 3i :f(i) > g(i)] ~f  > g. Then in Theorem 6.3 the condition of gain-loss 
consistency can be omitted. [] 
Thus in Theorem 2.c of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the condition of double 
matching can be omitted. For n = 2 the result of the above observation does not hold, as 
Figure 1 shows. It also illustrates that gain-loss consistency cannot be omitted in Theo- 
rem 6.3. 
V= I f(2) 
f(1)= ~ f(1)/2+f(2) 
-2ff2) 
V=f( 1 )+2f( o2)  . ,~, ,~ ~ Og 
V=ffl)+f(2) 
v=f(1)+f(2) 
f(P, 
9 h 
V=f(1)+f(2) 
Figure 1. (Necessity of gain-loss consistency). Preferences are represented bythe function V. Gain-loss consis- 
tency is violated: with -g(1) = g(2) = h(1) = -h(2)  = 2, we haveg + - h +,g -  - h - ,  butg > h. So CPT is 
violated. A CPT - representation can be established on the first three quadrants, by setting W({1}) = W({2}) = 
1A, and v = identity. A CPT-representation can also be established on the first, third, and fourth quadrant, by 
setting W({1}) = W({2}) = 1/2, v is identity on IR - ,  and v is twice identity on IR +. In particular on all 
sign-comonotonic sets F A~ we have a CPT representation. Also, ifx, y,x' ,y'  are of a same sign, then [x;y] > * 
[x'; y'] if and only ifx - y _> x' - y', so that sign-comonotonic (even cosigned) tradeoff consistency holds. All 
conditions of Statement (ii) in Theorem 6.3, execpt gainqoss consistency, are satisfied. 
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8.2. A weakening of sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency: Characterizing CPT as EU 
within each sign-comonotonic subset 
Under monotonicity conditions, lightly stronger than those in Observation 8.1, another 
generalization is possible. It then suffices to obtain EU within each sign-comonotonic 
* t ! subset. To formulate the result, we definexy > Aox y if there exist prospects f, g, and a 
state j, such thatxjf ~ yjg andx ' f  < Y'ig, andxjf, yjg, x'jf, y'jg E ~o.  So this is likexy > 
cs x y ,  only now the sign-comonotonic set ~o  has been incorporated in the notation. 
Similarly we writexy ~ *Aox'Y' ifxff ~ yjg andx'Jf ~ y'jg, andxf  , yjg, x'jf, y'jg E ~Ao, and, 
finally, j is ~o ~ essential. We say that ~ satisfies weaksign-comonotonic tradeoffconsistency 
if there do not exist yo  andx, y,x'y' such that bothxy * ' ' * > AoXY andx'y' ~ AoXY hold. This 
condition is weaker than sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency because it only ensures 
tradeoff consistency within the same set ~o .  It implies the existence of a CPT representa- 
tion with each ~jAo, as will be demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 8.2. Actually, 
any condition giving a CPT representation with each set yo  (i.e., an EU represen- 
tation) will imply weak sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency; hence, it could re- 
place the latter in the proposition below. Figure 1 also shows that, for n = 2, a CPT 
representation within each maximal sign-comonotonic set ~o  does not imply CPT. 
Proposition 8.2. Let n _> 3, and suppose the following monotonicities are satisfied: [Vi: 
f(i) >~ g(i)] ~f  ~ g, [Vi :f(i) ~ g(i), 3i :f(i) > g (i)] ~f  > g. Then in Statement (ii) of 
Theorem 6.3, not only gain-loss consistency can be dropped, but also sign- 
comonotonic tradeoff consistency an be weakened to weak sign-comonotonic trade- 
off consistency, or, alternatively, the requirement that within each sign-comonotonic 
set an EU representation holds. [] 
8.3. Stronger conditions 
The tradeoff consistency conditions can be strengthened. In CU, for revelations of * 
relations from (3.1) and (3.2), only the cumulative vents concerning statej need to be 
the same, not the entire rank-orderings of the states. In SDEU, for revelations of * 
relations from (3.1) and (3.2), only the signs of the outcomes x,y, x', y' need to be the 
same, not the entire sign-profile of prospects. In CPT the combinations of these obser- 
vations hold. The following result is derived by substitution: 
Proposition 8.3. 
Under CU, no contradictions can arise between orderings of value differences derived 
from (3.1) and (3.2) whenever: 
there exists a partition {.4, B} of S\{j} such that 
[Vi EA  :f(i) < x,x',y,y'] and [Vi ~ B :f(i) ~> x,x',y,y'], 
and the same holds for g instead off. 
Under SDEU, no contradictions can arise between orderings of value differences 
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derived from (3.1) and (3.2) whenever all x, x', y, y' are nonnegative, or they are all 
nonpositive. 
Under CPT, no contradictions can arise between orderings of value differences de- 
rived from (3.1) and (3.2) whenever 
there exists a partition {A,B} of S\{j} such that 
[Vi E A: f(i) <, x,x', y, y'] and [Vi E B: f(i) >~ x,x', y, y'], 
the same holds forg instead off, and allx, x',y,y' 
are nonnegative, or they are all nonpositive. [] 
The tradeoff consistency ondition used in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to charac- 
terize CPT is stronger than sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency, and weaker than the 
last condition above. The prospects in (3.1) and (3.2) are assumed comonotonic, but they 
need not be cosigned, onlyx, x',y,y' should have the same sign. Another difference isthat 
Tversky and Kahneman impose the conditions with respect to every subpartition of the 
state space, whereas this paper only considers the most refined partition. 
8.4. Infinite state spaces 
Finally, we briefly discuss the extension to infinite state spaces. So we assume now that 
the state space S is an infinite set. The outcome setX is, as before, a connected topolog- 
ical space. Prospects are functions from S toX. S andXcan be endowed with an algebra, 
or a ~r-algebra, nd then prospects can be restricted to those that are "measurable;" this 
does not affect he subsequent discussion. ~ denotes the set of simple prospects, i.e., 
prospects taking only a finite number of outcomes. We extend the assumption of true 
mixedness, by assuming that there exists a simple prospectf E ~ with bothf  + > 0 and 
0~f - .  
Observation 8.4. Theorem 6.3 can be modified by allowing the state space S to be 
infinite, and then restricting the conditions and representation to the simple pros- 
pects. [] 
Here continuity of the preference r lation is imposed within each set of simple pros- 
pects, measurable with respect to a fixed finite partition of S. The extension to nonsimple 
prospects can be obtained by means of the techniques explicated in Wakker (1993b). In 
short, the extension to bounded prospects 7 is obtained by imposing monotonicity (f(s) 
g(s) for all s then f ~ g), and the requirement that for each bounded prospect f there 
exists a simple prospect g such that g + ~ f+, g -  N f - ,  and g - f. The extension to 
nonbounded prospects can be obtained by "truncation-continuity" conditions, but will 
not be discussed here any further. 
A useful condition for capacities i solvability. Capacity Wis solvable if for all eventsA 
C C and all W(A) < b <_ W(C) there exists an event B such thatA C B C C and W(B) 
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= b. This condition was introduced by Gilboa (1987), who used the term convex-ranged. 
The preference condition to characterize solvability of W + in the above observation is as 
follows. Let (or, A; O,A c) denote the prospect that assigns outcome a to eventA, and 0 to 
event A c. The following condition characterizes solvability of W +, as follows from 
substitution: 
For all eventsA C C, outcomes ~ ~ 0, and prospects f, if (a,A; 0,A r ~< f ~ (o~, C; 0, 
Cc), then there exists an event B such thatA C B C C, andf  - (~x, B; 0, BC). 
Similarly, solvability of W- is characterized bythe following condition: 
For all eventsA C C, outcomes cx < 0, and prospects f, if (o~,A; 0,A c) ~> f >~ (~x, C; 0, 
Cc), then there exists an event B such thatA C B C C, andf  - (oL, B; 0, Be). 
9. Characteristics of the value function 
In this section we compare the curvature of value functions, derive diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion, and characterize some parametric families of value functions. We 
begin by extending the classical results of Arrow-Pratt on comparability ofutility func- 
tions to Cumulative Prospect Theory. It is noteworthy that these results can be obtained 
globally, as in Expected Utility, rather than in terms of local utility functions exploited by 
Machina (1982). In EU, comparisons ofutility functions are interpreted in terms of risk 
aversion. In CPT, the comparisons of value functions are interpreted in terms of the 
evaluation of outcomes, not in terms of attitudes towards risk. 
By means of the orderings of tradeoffs, we can compare orderings of value differences. 
Thus we obtain transparent characterizations of the classical properties of value func- 
tions. Furthermore, the proofs are so simple, given Lemma 6.1, that we shall not elabo- 
rate them. 
For Quiggin's rank-dependent utility for decision making under isk, results concern- 
ing "risk aversion" were given by Yaari (1987), Chew, Karni, and Safra (1987), Chew 
(1989), Chateauneuf and Cohen (1990), and others. These papers used the condition of 
aversion to mean-preserving spreads, or conditions of a similar nature. At any rate, these 
conditions imultaneously restrict he value function and the decision weights, and do 
not separate between them. The latter was done in Wakker (1990b); he used, in the 
context of rank-dependent utility, derived tradeoffs, imilar to the present paper. 
We only consider the case X = IR below. The results also hold for any outcome set 
consisting of a real interval within IR that contains 0 in its interior. 
Assumption 9.1. All hypotheses of Theorem 6.3 hold, and X = IR. The ordering of 
outcomes by ~ coincides with the natural ordering _>. [] 
Obviously, the above assumption implies that the value function is strictly increasing. 
Now suppose there are two decision makers ~ 1, ~ 2 each satisfying Assumption 9.1, 
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with value functions vl and V 2 respectively. The following results hold without additional 
restrictions on the gain- and loss capacities of the two decision makers. Let > *s I be 
derived from > 1 as above. When there is no ambiguity, we omit the subscripts c, s. The 
reversed and nonstrict relations are defined similarly; the same notations apply to > 2 
We say that > 2 exhibits greater diminishing sensitivity than > 1 if there are no a > [3 _> y 
> 8 _> 0 such that c~[3 ~< "1 y8 and or[3 > *2 y~, and there are no o~ _ [3 _< y ___ 8 _< 0 such 
that [3c~ ~< "1 8y and 13a > *2 8y.  
It is instructive to interpret this relation in terms of Expected Utility. The first part of 
the definition, pertaining to the positive domain, corresponds in Expected Utility to a 
greater decrease in marginal utility. The second part of the definition, pertaining to the 
negative domain, corresponds in Expected Utility to a greater increase in marginal util- 
ity. Recall that the basic property of the utility function in Expected Utility is concavity, 
or decreasing marginal utility. Consequently, utility functions are naturally compared in 
terms of the degree of concavity as was done by Arrow-Pratt. In contrast, the basic 
property of the value function in prospect theory is diminishing sensitivity giving rise to 
an S-shape function, concave for gains and convex for losses. For empirical evidence, see 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Consequently, value functions are more naturally com- 
pared in terms of the degree of diminishing sensitivity as we do in the present section. 
Theorem 9.2. Under CPT, > 2 exhibits greater diminishing sensitivity than > 1 if and 
only if V 2 = +or  1 where 0 is concave on IR  + and convex on IR  - .  [] 
As a corollary we obtain the characterization f a concave/convex value function vof a 
single preference r lation > on IR  + and IR  - separately. The result follows readily from 
Theorem 9.2. Note that the combination of (a) and (d) below characterize an S-shape 
value function discussed above. 
Corollary 9.3. Under Assumption 9.1 we have: 8
(a) {v is concave on IR  + } <=> {[x + e; y + e] > * [x; y] for no e > 0, x > y _> 0}; 
(b) {v is concave on lR -  } c> {[x + e;y + e] >* [x;y]fornoe > 0,0 ->x + e >y + e}; 
(c) {v is convex on lR  + } c> {[x - e;y - e] >* Ix;y] forno e > 0,x - e >y  - e _> 0}; 
(d) {v is convex on lR -  } <=> {[x - e;y - e] >* [x;y] forno e > 0,0 _>x >y}. [] 
Next we turn to loss aversion (see Figure 2). Loss aversion holds if the value function is 
steeper for losses than for gains. That is, for allx > y >_ O, v(x) - v(y) <_ v ( -y )  - v ( -x ) .  
This property is easily characterized in EU or CU by excluding, for all x > y __ 0, Ix; y] 
> * [ -y ;  -x]  or [x;y] > c* [ -y ;  -x]  respectively. In order to characterize loss aversion in 
CPT, however, we must adopt a more complicated procedure because we cannot directly 
compare value differences ofpositive and negative outcomes. Supposex > y __ 0, and we 
find prospects f, g such that f  + N s g + N ~ f -  _ _s and g -  - -)7 (see figure 2a). 
Then the ordering of v(x) - v(y) and v ( -y )  - v ( -x )  can be inferred from the prefer- 
ence betweenf and g: 
v(x) - v(y) <_ v ( -y )  - v ( -x )  ~=>f< g. 
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f~-g 0' 
f- ~ -~, 
Figure 2a. The easy case where 
x,y,-x,-y can be matched by 
Qg+, f~ and g- respectively. 
The preference between f and g 
reveals the ordering of the 
value difference between x,y 
and between -y,-x. If f~-g then 
the former difference is larger. 
f~-g 
s 
a}_j 
s 
s 
- i  
Figure 2b. Here x,y,-x,-y 
cannot be matched by ~g+, 
and g- as in a). If x and y 
are not too far apart, then x+, 
y§ x-, y- exist hat can be 
matched by ~ ~ f; and g- 
respectively, and such that 
[x+;y+] matches [x;y] and 
[y.;x-] matches [-y;-x]. The 
preference between f and g 
reveals the ordering of the 
value difference between 
x+,y+ and that between 
x_, y_, thus indirectly the 
ordering of value difference 
between x,y and -y,-x. 
FIGURE 2 (Loss aversion). Let x>y>0. Because of sign-dependence, there is no direct way to 
reveal the ordering of the value difference between x and y and that between -y and -x. The 
comparison is obtained indirectly, through the preference between prospects f,g as above. 
A preference f>-g reveals that the value difference between x and y is larger than that 
between -y and -x. That is, the preference f~-g is to be excluded by loss aversion. 
Loss aversion in the small implies loss aversion in the large. Even if a difference v(x) 
-v (y )  is very small, if x, y are extreme and the value funct ion is bounded,  it may still be 
impossible to find a prospect f satisfying both f+ N s and f -  - -Z ,  or a prospect g
satisfying both g -  ~ -3~ g + N )S To handle these cases, we find Ix + ; y + ] that matches 
[x;y], and [y _ ;x _ ] that matches [ -y ;  -x ] ,  where the new outcomes are all close to 0 (see 
figure 2b). Wri t ing ~c+* for the intersect ion of ~> c+ and ~< c+, and ~ c -  for the inter- 
section of ~> *_ and ~<c-,* and dropping subscripts, we can prove: 
Proposit ion 9.4 (see figure 2b). Suppose Assumpt ion 9.1 holds. Then  loss aversion 
holds if and only if there are nox  > y _ 0, x + > y + _> 0, 0 _> y _ > x_ ,  and f, g, such 
that: 
Ix;y] -*  [x+;y+], [-y; -x] -*  [y_;x_], 
f+  Nf+,g+ _ f+, f -  _ f _ ,g -  N f_ ,and  f>g.  [] 
Note that concavity of v on the entire domain  can be obta ined by combin ing loss 
aversion with condit ions (a) and (b) of Corollary 9.3. 
Next we turn to the characterizat ion f the log/power and l inear/exponential  f milies 
of value functions. The following results are direct corollaries of Theorems 3 and 4 in 
Miyamoto (1988): 
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Proposition 9.5. Suppose Assumption 9.1 holds. Invariance of preference on ~-+ with 
respect to multiplication of outcomes by a positive constant 9 (Vf, g E o ~+, ~r > 0:f  3 
g ~=~ of 3 o'g) characterizes the log/power family, i.e., either v :x ~ Xx ~ + ~" for positive 
h x er and real % or v : x ~ Mog(x) + ~" for positive k and real -r (the latter parame- 
trized by o" = 0). [] 
Proposition 9.6. Suppose Assumption 9.1 holds. Invariance of preferences on ~-+ with 
respect to addition of a positive constant m to outcomes (Vf, g ~ Y+, r > 0:f  3 g ~- r  
+ f 3 "r + g) characterizes the linear/exponential f mily, i.e., either v : x ~ Xe "x + "r 
for positive h • ~ and real "r, or v : x ~ Xx + "r for positive X and real "r (the latter 
parametrized by o- = 0). [] 
Naturally, the same results can be applied to ~-- to characterize the same forms of v 
on IR - .  The parameters for v on IR - are independent of the parameters on IR +. 
10. Appendix: proofs 
10.1. Appendix A1. A preparation: the proportionality lemma 
The following lemma serves to derive proportionality of additive value functions: 
I .emma A1 [Proportionality lemma]. Suppose (V1, V2) are nonconstant continuous 
additive value functions for a binary relation 3 '  on a connected topological product 
space C • A, (W1, W2) nonconstant continuous additive value functions for a binary 
relation 3"  on a connected topological product space C • B. Write vl wl 3 '* sit1 if 
there exist a2, b2 E A such that (Vl, a2) 3 '  (Wl, b2), (Sl, a2) 4 '  (tl, b2); if the latter 
preference is strict write VlWl > '* sit> Analogously define 3 "* and > "* on C from 
3 "on C x B. Suppose there do not exist v 1, w 1, sl, t I such that [v lw 1 3 ' *  s it I and s it 1 
>"* VlW~] or [VlWl > '* sit1 andsff l  3 "* VlWl]. Then V1 = -r + ~WI for real "r and 
positive ~. 
Proof. Note that (Vl, a2) > '  (W1, a2), (Vl, a2) 4 '  (Vl, a2) and @1, a2) 3 "(Vl, a2) imply 
(vl, a2) 3"  (wl, a2); thus Vl(Vl) -> Vl(Wl) implies Wl(Vl) - Wl(Wl). The reversed 
implication holds similarly, and necessarily V1 -- ~oW1 for a strictly increasing transfor- 
mation + that furthermore must be continuous, because it is onto from one interval to 
another. Now the condition in the lemma implies that V1 differences are ordered the 
same way as W1 differences whenever both the V1 differences can be matched by 1/2 
differences, and the W1 differences by W2 differences. Next let Vl(Xl) E int(Vl(C)). 
There exists an open interval ]Vl(v0, VI(yl)[ around Vl(xl) so small that the difference 
VI(Yl) - Vl(vl) can be matched by a V2 difference, and also the difference WI(Yl) - 
Wl(vl) can be matched by a W2 difference. Hence on this open interval around Vl(xl) 
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the transformation dO preserves ordering of differences. It must be affine there. So the 
continuous dO has second derivative 0 at every interior point Vl(xl) of its domain, and 
consequently is anne. [] 
10.2. Appendix A2. Proof of theorem 6.3 
In this section we prove Theorem 6.3. Since necessity of the conditions is obvious, we 
shall only establish sufficiency, and the uniqueness results. 
First we derive some elementary implications. A first implication is sign-comonotonic 
triple cancellation. This holds if [x0f ~< yig, x'i[ ~ y'ig, xo ~ ~ Yig' ~ x' i~ ~ Y'ig'] for all i,x, 
..., g' for which the four prospects are sign-comonotonic. It is the (generalized) triple 
cancellation condition (see, for instance, Wakker, 1989, or, for two dimensions, Fish- 
burn, 1970, or Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky, 1971) restricted to maximal sign- 
comonotonic subsets. Note that for a state i which is inessential on the maximal sign- 
comonotonic set containing the prospects in question, the condition trivially holds true. 
For other states i the condition is the restriction of tradeoff consistency tothe case where 
all orderings of tradeoffs have been derived from one same state i, and from one same 
maximal sign-comonotonic set. An implication of sign-comonotonic triple cancellation is
sign-comonotonic independence. This holds if [Xi? ~ Xig ~ x ' i f  ~ x'ig-'] for all i,x, ..., ~for 
which the four prospects are sign-comonotonic. It is the well-known independence on- 
dition, restricted to maximal sign-comonotonic sets. It follows from sign-eomonotonic 
triple cancellation by substitutingf = g = ]~,x = y,x' = y',f' = f, g' = ~ It says that on 
sign-comonotonic sets, preferences are independent of a common outcome. It then 
follows, stronger, that: 
Lemma A2.1 [Strong Sign-Comonotonie Independence]. On sign-comonotonic sets, 
preferences are independent of any number of common outcomes. 
Proof. A typical case is illustrated in figure 3. For the context of cumulative utility a 
formal argumentation has been given in Wakker (1991). The argumentation is not af- 
fected by sign-dependence. [] 
I_emma A2.2 [Monotonicity lemma]. Weak monotonicity is satisfied, as well as strong 
monotonicity on each maximal sign-comonotonic set. 
Proof. By Wakker (1989, Lemma VI.4.10), weak monotonicity is satisfied on o~+ as 
well as on ~--. By Lemma A2.1, weak monotonicity isalso satisfied within each set ~o~,4: If 
x ~ f(i), and bothx/fandfare contained in Y ,  then bothx andf(i) must be nonpositive 
or nonnegative. Let it be the former; we then first obtainx d -  ~ f - ,  and nextx/f ~ fby  
Lemma A2.1. Finally, this implies weak monotonicity in general, because xi ~ fcan be 
inferred from transitivity and preferencesx/f ~ xi l f  ~ ... ~ ximf ~ f, wherexi ~ xi 1 
... ~ Xi m ~ f(i) are chosen such that each subsequent pair is sign-comonotonic. 
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Figure 3(Independence of common outcomes). A = {4, 5 . . . . .  9} and o = identity (outcomes "increase"). {2, 3, 
5, 6, 9} is the set of states at which the (common) outcomes are to be replaced. It is to be shown that this 
replacement does not affect preference. The common outcomes are replaced one by one, first those that are to 
be increased "from right to left", for, subsequently, states 9, 3, 2, next those that are to be decreased, "from left 
to right", for, subsequently, states 5, 6. These replacements donot affect he rank-ordering of the states; thus, 
by comonotonic independence, they indeed o not affect preference. Note that, to preserve rank-ordering, the 
common outcome at state 3 should be replaced prior to the common outcome at state 2, and the common 
outcome at state 5 prior to that at state 6. 
Next letx > f ( i ) ,  where i is ~o A~ essential and both prospects are contained in ~jAo. Say 
both x andf(i) are nonnegative. Then i is, by comonotonic ndependence, also essential 
on U~Ao+. Here usual "non-sign-dependent" results can be invoked, and x0 r+ > f+ 
follows from Wakker (1989, Lemma VI.4.10). From strong sign-comonotonic indepen- 
dence (Lemma A2.1),xif > f follows. [] 
Because ~ is truly mixed we have: 
There exists an event R and an ordering 6 such that for a prospect in ~6 
both the positive and the negative part are not equivalent to 0. (A2.1) 
Obviously, given the existence of a prospect with positive and negative part nonequiva- 
lent to 0, R and 6 as in (A2.1) can always be found. We establish an additive representa- 
tion on a two-dimensional subspace, with negative outcomes in one dimension, and 
positive outcomes in the other. R c is ~6-  essential (compare the negative part of the 
above-mentioned prospect with 0), and must contain ~6-  essential states; analogously 
R is ~6+ essential, and contains ~++ essential states. In the remainder of the con- 
struction of the two-dimensional representation we suppress ~6-  inessential states 
from R c, and ~6 + inessential states from R on ~6 +. That is, we assume that all states 
are essential. Suppression of inessential states affects neither preference nor the condi- 
tions that this paper imposed on preferences. We can always substitute outcomes on 
inessential states to stay within ~6 such that all operations below are possible. Let 
~(1),~(n) denote the set of prospects from ~+ that have an outcome quivalent to 0 on 
coordinates 6(2), ..., 6(n - 1) (see figure 4). This is isomorphic to a full two- 
dimensional product space, of the form X-  x X + . Here sign-comonotonic triple can- 
cellation reduces to "triple cancellation." By strong monotonicity on 5~6, both states i and 
n are essential of ~(1),O(n). Hence by Wakker (1989, Theorem III.6.6(iii) and Remark A3.1) 
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{x:x~0} is [ 
the range 
for state 1 
0 ~1 {13} is the range for {x:x~0} is the 
I states 2..... n-1 range for state n 
Figure 4 (The set Fd(1)'~ Suppose 6 is identity. Acts from F6(1),6(n) "live" only on states 1, n. 
there exist continuous additive value functions, denoted by V R- and V R + in the remainder 
of this proof (dependency on 6 is not expressed in the notation), for the preference 
relation on this space ~(1),6(,0. VR- ,  V~+ are "joint" (having common unit) interval 
scales. We may and will set V R-  (0) = V R + (0) = O. 
Now we establish a CU + representation ~-+, and a CU-  representation ~--, 
each up to a positive factor. First we consider o ~+ . Because > is truly mixed, o ~+ has at 
least one essential state, so every am + has at least one essential state. First suppose very 
am+ has exactly one essential state. Now we cannot invoke Theorem 4.3, because that 
required that some am + have two essential states; neither can we invoke Theorem VI.5.1 
of Wakker (1989) because that essentially needs topological separability for the present 
case. We shall derive the CU + representation from the function V R + as obtained above. 
Each prospect from am + is equivalent to the constant prospect identical to the outcome 
for the essential state. By strong monotonicity the function V R + obtained above repre- 
sents preferences over these. So then a CU + representation  o~ + results where on 
each set am + the essential state has decision weight 1, and the value function for gains is 
the continuous function V R +. 
If for some permutation o the set a m+ has two essential states, then by Theorem 4.3 a 
CU + representation o ~+ is obtained, which is an interval scale. We let it assign value 
0 to 0. Subsequently we deduce from the Proportionality Lemma A1 the fact that the 
value function of this CU + representation is a positive multiple of V R +, as follows. First 
restrict attention, for any positive nonmaximal outcomes t* > v > 0, to a two- 
dimensional subspace of o~+ isomorphic to the full product space {~ ~ X: 0 ~< a ~< Ix} x 
{[3 E X: [3 > Ix} with both dimensions essential to get, from Lemma A1, proportionality 
of the value function and V R + separately on {or ~ X: 0 ~< c~ < tx} and {[3 E X: [3 > ~}. 
Repeat his with v instead of Ix. The overlap {o~ E X: v ~< o~ < Ix} shows that there indeed 
is one positive cr such that the value function is cr times V R +. 
Exactly the same procedure can be adopted to get a CU-  representation o~-. The 
value function v : X--+ IR describes the value function of CU + on X + , and of CU-  on 
X - .  To derive continuity of the function v, note that it describes the value function of 
CU + on X + , and of CU-  on X - .  Because v is continuous on X + and on X - ,  and v(0) 
= 0, the range ofv is an interval, and has no gaps; v must be continuous. Below, v will be 
rescaled for positive outcomes, i.e., there it will be multiplied by a positive constant. That 
will not affect its continuity. 
We summarize: 
V R-  and V R + are positive affine transforms of v on their domains; 
V R- ,  V R +, and v are continuous. 
(A2.2) 
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Now letA, o be fixed for a while. We derive an additive representation  ~o~Ao. IrA orA c 
is inessential on ~o~o, then we can simply use the CU + or CU-  representation. There- 
fore let bothA andA c be essential on ~o~o. Then on KAo there are at least wo essential 
states. The condition of sign-comonotonic generalized triple cancellation, as implied by 
sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency, simply reduces to generalized triple cancellation 
on ~o.  Generalized triple cancellation was used in Wakker (1989, Theorem III.6.6(iii) 
and Remark A3.1) to characterize additive representability on full product sets. The set 
KAo, however, is not a full product set. It is a product of two (rank-ordered sets =) 
maximal comonotonic subsets of a product set, one isomorphic to ~o- ,  the other to 
~o~Ao + ; we shall use the notations KAo-, ~o~4o + also for these subsets. We suppress for the 
time being the states inessential on o ~~ Then, by Theorem C.6 and Remark C.7 of 
Chateauneuf and Wakker (1991), an additive representation is obtained on ~o~o; we may 
let the additive value functions assign 0 to 0. On o~o + the additive representation is 
proportional to CU +. This follows from the uniqueness result of Theorem 4.3 if o~4o+ 
has two or more essential states. If ~jAo + has only one essential state the argument is
similar to the derivation of (A2.2), as follows. We again suppress the ~o~o+ inessential 
states inA, and restrict attention to prospects from ~o that are constant (nonpositive) 
onA c. This yields a two-dimensional space, and by the Proportionality Lemma A1 the 
additive value function on the two-dimensional space for gains is proportional to V R +, 
and therefore to the value function v, and so to CU +. Similarly, on ~o~o- the additive 
representation is proportional to CU- .  We conclude: 
There exists ~o  > 0 s . t . f~  X~o CU+(f  +) + CU- ( f - )  represents ~> 
on ,~o. 
Thus we have obtained a CPT representation each ~o~o. Note that k~o > 0 can be 
chosen freely if ~o ~ + or yo -  is inessential. Below we set then ~o = 1. The next step is 
to fit all these representations together into one global CPT functional. Only here gain- 
loss consistency is used. 
Lemma A2.3. There exists a CPT functional on the entire o~that isrepresenting within 
each KAo, with the value function v continuous. 
Proof. For the time being we only require the functions discussed below to be repre- 
senting within each U~ ~ We rescale the CU + representation such that ~6 = 1 (for R 
see (A2.2); dependence on 6 is not expressed innotation there). This can be obtained by 
multiplying the "old" CU + representation (so v on X +) by k~6 and by dividing each 
. ~ + + 
old k~o by X/~6 and henceforth calling the latter quotient k~o. IfA orA c is inessential 
then we set k~] o = 1. We prove now that all k~o are 1. Suppose that bothA andA c are 
~o 4~ essential. By continuity we can straightforwardly constructf E ~o, f r  ~ 2fl~6, such 
that: 
0 <f+- - f+, f -  _ f r -  < 0, andfr _ 0. 
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By gain-loss consistency, also f -  0. Substituting the representations within ~6 and ~aAo, 
we get CU + (f" +) + CU - (f'-) = 0, and ~o CU + (f+) + CU-  ( f - )  = 0. Further CU + 
(Jr+) = CU + (f+) > 0 and CU - ( f - )  = CU-  ~- )  < 0. These equalities together imply 
k~o = 1. Continuity of v was established in (A2.2); as pointed out above (A2.2), the 
rescaling of v on X + does not affect continuity. [] 
Lemma A2.4. CPT holds. 
Proof. It remains to be shown that the CPT functional, as constructed above, is repre- 
senting. Let f  ~ ~o.  Sayf ~ 0. We can, by continuity, findg + E ~o andx ~ X, such 
thatf  N g + _ s Then, because the first pair is contained in ~o the second in if+, and 
CPT is representing within ~o and if+, CPT(f) = CPT(g +) = CPT(x-) follows. Thus 
any prospect has a CPT value identical to the "certainty-equivalent," i.e.,the outcome 
equivalent to it. Because CPT orders certain outcomes according to preference, it is 
representing on the entire ~. [] 
Thus the proof of the implication (ii) ~ (i) in Theorem 6.3 has been completed. Next 
we turn to the uniqueness result. If each ~ + has exactly one essential state, then W + 
must be such that for each ~ + that single essential state has decision weight one. This 
uniquely determines W+ . If ~+ has two or more essential states, then uniqueness ofW + 
follows from Theorem 4.3. Analogously uniqueness of W- follows. Given this unique- 
ness of W + and W- ,  the uniqueness of V R- and V R + in (A2.2) up to common scale and 
location together with v(0) = 0 determine v on IR + and v on 117 - up to a common scale. 
Because v can be multiplied by any positive constant, it indeed is a ratio scale. 
10.3. Appendix A3. Proofs of results of section 8 
As a preparation for the proof of Observation 8.1, we list below the conditions of Theo- 
rem 6.3 except gain-loss consistency: 
Assumption A3.1. The Structural Assumption 2.1 holds, and the truly-mixed case 
holds. Moreover, weak0rdering, continuity, and sign-comonotonic tradeoff consis- 
tency hold. [] 
In the proof of Theorem 6.3 in Appendix A2, gain-loss consistency is only used in the 
proof of Lemma A2.3, so the results obtained up to that point hold under Assumption 
A3.1. They include: 
Lemma A3.2. under Assumption A3.1 a CU + representation exists on o %+ , and a 
CU-  representation exists on ~- .  Within each set ffAo there exists a representation 
of the formf  ~-~ k~oCU + (f+) + CU-  (f-) .  [] 
Note that k~o is uniquely determined except in trivial cases of inessentiality ofA orA c. 
In the latter cases we set k~o = 1. ~o  and ~o '  are directly gain-loss linked if there exists 
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anf  E ~o ~ f-) ~o '  such thatf  + > 0, 0 > f -  , f  ~ 0. The transitive closure of the directly 
gain-loss linked relation is called the (indirectly) gain-loss linked relation. The following 
lemma follows from substitution. The subsequent lemma is proven as Theorem 6.3, with 
Lemma A2.3 derived from Lemma A3.3. 
Lemma A3.3. Suppose ~o and ~o '  are gain-loss linked. Then h~o = hBo' can be 
chosen in Lemma A3.2. [] 
Lemma A3.4. Suppose ~o~o and ~o '  are gain-loss linked whenever bothA andA c are 
essential on ~o~o, and B and B c on ~o ' .  Then in Theorem 6.3 the condition of gain- 
loss consistency can be dropped. [] 
Now we are ready to prove Observation 8.1. 
Proof of Observation 8.1. Denote by [o(1) . . . .  , o(k), [, o(k + 1), ..., o(n)] the set ~o ~ 
with A = {o(k + 1) . . . .  , o(n)}; here 1 _< k _< n - 1 is implicit. This set is directly 
gain-loss linked to every set obtained by moving [ to the left or right, as long as I is 
between o(1) and o(n): Take, by monotonicity and continuity, a prospect f - 0 with 
f(o(1)) < 0 - f(o(2)) - ... - f(o(n - 1)) - 0 < f(o(n)). A directly gain-loss linked set 
also results from interchanging states that are to the left of the [ symbol, or to the 
right of the I symbol: one takes a prospectf  - 0 that is constant on {o(1), ..., o(k)} 
and on {o(k + 1), ..., o(n)}. Thus moving the symbol [ leads to new gain-loss linked 
sets, as well as interchanging states at one side of 1. By these operations one sees that 
all sets ~o~ for ~ ~ A ~ S are mutually gain-loss linked. Lemma A3.4 now gives the 
desired result. [] 
Proof of Proposition 8.2. Strong sign-comonotonic independence and monotonicity 
are derived as in Lemmas A2.1 and A2.2. We begin by deriving a CPT representation 
within each maximal sign-comonotonic subset ~o~o. First consider the case whereA = S; 
i.e., consider the set ~+.  On this set continuity, weak ordering, monotonicity, and 
generalized triple cancellation (see beginning of Appendix A2) are satisfied. Hence by 
Wakker (1991a, Theorem 3.2) there exists a continuous additive representation for ~ on 
:~+ that is possibly extended real-valued: it might assign value infinite to a maximal 
prospect, and value minus infinite to a prospect (e.g., 0) that is minimal on the domain 
under consideration. Consider outcomes 0 < v < po < ~r, and the two-dimensional 
substructures {x E X: v ~ x ~ IX} x {x E X: IX ~< x ~ o-} x {~r} x ... x {~r} and {x E X: 
0 < x ~ v} x {x E X: v ~ x ~< IX} x {~r} x ... x {~r} of ~ +. By the proportionality 
lemma A1, and sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency, the first-state additive value 
function and the second-state additive value function are linear transforms of each other 
on {x ~ X: v <~ x ~ Ix}. This holds for all 0 < v ~< IX with Ix nonmaximal, and also for all 
pairs of additive value functions. By Wakker (1993a, Proposition 3.5) the additive repre- 
sentation isreal-valued after all. By continuity, the additive value functions must also be 
related by linear transformations at the outcome 0 as well as at maximal outcomes. We 
can let the additive value functions assign value 0 to outcome 0. So a CPT representation 
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with a continuous value function has been obtained on :~o+. Similarly a CPT represen- 
tation with a continuous value function is obtained on ~o- .  
Next consider a set ~o A~ with O ~ A ~ S. This set is a product of two rank-ordered 
sets. By monotonicity, all states are essential on this set. Weak ordering, continuity, 
monotonicity, and generalized triple cancellation are satisfied. Hence by Chateauneuf 
and Wakker (1991, Theorem C.6 and Remark C.7) there exists a continuous additive 
representation for ~ on ~o~o. If A contains two or more states, then the ("gains") 
additive value functions related to the states of A can be taken proportional by a reason- 
ing as in the discussion of ~o+ above. Similarly, i fA c contains two or more states, then 
the ("losses") additive value functions related to the states ofA  c can be taken propor- 
tional. Again a CPT representation has resulted on ~0~4o. 
So on each set yo  a CPT ( = EU) representation exists, with a value function vA~ 
By the analogue of Lemma 6.1, >~]o and ~]o  still reveal orderings of v A~ differ- 
ences. It suffices to show that for any two different yo  and ~o' ,  vAo on X + is a 
positive multiple of v B~ also v A~ on X-  is a positive multiple of v ~~ Then xy > ~]o 
x'y' and x'y' ~o,XY cannot both occur, also ifA ~ B, and/or o ~ o'. In other words, 
sign-comonotonic tradeoff-consistency is then satisfied, and we can invoke Observation 8.1. 
Suppose that ~.4o and ~o '  are directly gain-loss linked. Let fbe  a prospect in their 
intersection with f - 0, f+ > 0, f -  < 0. Consider the two-dimensional subspace of 
prospects that are 0 wherefis 0, that are constant positive-or-zero wherefis positive, and 
constant negative-or-zero wheref is  negative. This two-dimensional subspace is a full 
product set; it is contained in both ~o~o and ~o ' ;  and both dimensions are essential. 
Both the representation f ~o~o and that of ~o '  are additive representations on the sub- 
space. By standard uniqueness results this implies that the value functions of ~o  and ~o '  
are proportional on X + , as well as on X - .  We saw already in the proof of Observation 8.1 
that all nondegenerate sets ~Ao and ~o '  are indirectly gain-loss linked. This completes the 
proof. [] 
Proof of Observation 8.4. Suppose the preference conditions in Statement (ii) of The- 
orem 6.3 hold on ~.  For every finite partition of S, fine enough to satisfy true-mixedness, 
Theorem 6.3 can be applied to the prospects measurable with respect to that partition 
(continuity of the preference relation is imposed within each such set of prospects). 
Next, the CPT representations can be fit together for different partitions, by considering 
common refinements of these partitions. This gives one overall CPT representation 
~.  Also the uniqueness results of Theorem 6.3 are the same here. Necessity of the 
preference conditions in Theorem 6.3 is straightforward. [] 
10. 4 Appendix A4. Proof of proposition 9. 4 
Proof of Proposition 9.4. First suppose loss aversion holds, and suppose x, ..., g are as 
described in the proposition. The preference f > g implies CPT(f +) - CPT(g +) > 
CPT(g- ) - CPT(f-  ). Hence CPT(s - CPT(y-+ ) > CPT(y-_ ) - CPT(:f_ ), i.e., 
v(x + ) - v(y + ) > v(y_ ) - v(x_ ). By Lemma 6.1 this implies v(x) - v(y) > v ( -y )  - 
v( -x) ,  contradicting loss aversion. 
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Next suppose the condition of the lemma holds. To derive is loss aversion. Because of 
true-mixedness there is an f E F R such that f+  > 0 and 0 > f - .  By continuity there 
exists ~x > 0 such that for each 0 _< x ___ Ix and - Ix - -y  -< 0 there is an f  E F R wi th f  + 
~andf -  - - )2  Also IX can be taken so small that for all suchx, y we have [x;y] - * C+ 
[x; y], [ -y ;  -x ]  - c*- [ -y;  -x] .  For the latter, seemingly trivial, relations it must be 
possible to find proper sign-comonotonic prospects as in (3.1) and (3.2). By continuity, 
for IX sufficiently small, this is possible. Thus for each Ix --- x > y > 0 there are prospects 
f, g such that f  + - ~ g + - )~ f -  - -~  g -  ~ - )2  The condition in the proposition ow 
impl iesf  < g. By substitution, v(x) - v(y) <- v ( -y )  - v ( -x ) .  On the interval [ -  IX, Ix] 
loss aversion holds. 
Next consider a general outcome z > 0. By continuity we can take an open interval I 
around z within IR  + so small that for allx, y from I there exist x +, y +, y _, x -  from the 
9 $ 
interval [ - tx, Ix] with [x;y] - c + [x + ;y + ], [ -y ;  -x ]  - c -  L v - ;x _ ]. As in the beginning of 
this proof, v(x + ) - v(y + ) <_ v(y_ ) - v(x_ ) follows; by repeated application of (6.7), 
v(x) - v(y) <_ v ( -y )  - v ( -x )  follows. So for each outcome z > 0 there exists an open 
neighborhood I such that for prospects with outcomes in this neighborhood loss aversion 
holds. This implies loss aversion "globally." [] 
No~s 
1. It has also been called the rank-dependent model. We use the adjective cumulative to refer to the model, 
and we use rank-dependence and sign-dependence to refer to specific patterns of choices (see Examples 
1.1 and 1.2). 
2. Properties of the decision weights will be characterized in a future paper. 
3. Because the standard interpretation f expected utility refers to acts rather than to prospects, the versions 
of expected utility and cumulative utility investigated in this paper should perhaps be called incremental 
expected utility and incremental cumulative utility. For brevity we omit the adjective incremental nd hope 
that this will cause no confusion. Also we write expected utility rather than subjective xpected utility. 
4. Given continuity and weak ordering; see Theorem 3.3 
5. A c denotes the complement ofA. 
6. Note that comonotonic prospects are cosigned if there exists a state i with f(i) = g(i) = O. 
7. A prospect is bounded if there is a lower bound outcome, dispreferred to all outcomes of the prospect, and, 
similarly, an upper bound outcome. 
8. Note that subscripts c,s have been dropped from the > * notations. 
9. Known in EU as constant relative risk aversion. In the present context he term preference homogeneity 
seems more appropriate. 
10. Known in EU as "constant (absolute) risk aversion." In the present context he term translation i depen- 
dence may be used. 
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